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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a personal income tax case. It involves the application of well-settled community
property law to a situation in which one spouse lives and works in Idaho while the other lives
and works in another state.

B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Tax Commission issued a Notice of Deficiency Determination to the Parkers on
April 2,2007, regarding the taxable years 2003 and 2004. (Stip. Facts at par. 15, R.00022C)
On May 3,2007, the Parkers' accountant protested the proposed deficiency and requested
a redetermination. (Stip. Facts at par. 17, R.00022C; Joint Exhibit 1-A, R.00022N) The Tax
Commission conducted an informal hearing pusuant to Idaho Code

5

63-3045. Following the

hearing, the Tax Commission issued a decision upholding the proposed deficiency. (Stip. Facts at
par. 21, R.00022C) The Tax Commission subsequently discovered a clerical error and issued an
Amended Decision on January 3, 2008. (Stip. Facts at par. 22, R.00022D) The Amended
Decision also upheld the proposed deficiency. (Stip. Facts, Joint Exhibit 3-C, R.00022000022U)
On February 22, 2008, the Parkers appealed the Tax Commission's decision to the Ada
County District Court by filing a Petition for Judicial Review. (R.00005-00008) The Tax
Commission filed an Answer on March 14,2008.
On June 24, 2008, the parties filed Stipulated Facts with the district court. (R.00022A00022U) The Parkers then filed a motion for summary judgment and the supporting affidavit of

David Parker on July 1, 2008. (R.00023-24) The Tax Commission submitted a motion to strike
specific portions of David Parker's affidavit. (R.00040)
The Tax Commission also responded to the motion for summary judgment on July 18,
2008. The Commission requested summary judgment in its favor and filed the rebuttal affidavit
of Jim Gunter. Mr. Gunter is a Tax Policy Specialist of the Tax Commission and the person who
heard the Parkers' administrative protest. (R.00028-34) The Parkers moved to strike portions of
Mr. Gunter's affidavit on August 1,2008. (R.00035-36)
The district court heard the parties' respective requests for summary judgment and motions
to strike on August 18, 2008. Following post-hearing submissions by both parties (R.00037R00038), the district court issued an Order that: 1) denied the Parkers' motion to strike; 2) denied
the Tax Commission's motion to strike; 3) denied the Parkers' motion for summary judgment; and,
4) granted summaryjudgment to the Tax Commission. (Order, R.00037-46)
The Parkers appealed the district court order denying their motion to strike and motion for
summary judgment on November 10,2008. (Notice of Appeal, R.00047) The district court entered
a final judgment in favor of the Tax Commission on November 21,2008. (Judgment, R.00050)
The Parkers filed the initial Appellants' Brief with this Court on March 11,2009. The Tax
Commission now submits this response brief.
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Stipulated Facts
The parties agreed to several facts in this matter as set forth in the Stipulated Facts filed
with the district court. (R.00022A-22U) The relevant stipulated facts are set forth below.
This is an individual income tax case involving the taxable years 2003 and 2004 (the taxable
years). (Stip. Facts, par. 1, R.00022A) David and Kathy Parker were married at all times d

~ the g

taxable years in question. (Stip. Facts, par. 2, R.00022A) Kathy Parker was domiciled in Idaho
during the taxable years. (Stip. Facts, par. 3, R.000224 David Parker was domiciled in Nevada
during the taxable years. (Stip. Facts, par. 4, R.00022A)
The Parkers filed income tax returns under the "married filing joint" status with both the
Internal Revenue Service and the Idaho State Tax Commission for the taxable years. (Stip. Facts,
par. 7, R.000224 Nevada does not impose an individual income tax, so the Parkers did not file a
tax return with the state of Nevada for the taxable years. (Stip. Facts, par. 8, R.00022A) On their
Idaho returns, the Parkers reported only income earned by Kathy Parker while she was domiciled in
Idaho. (Stip. Facts, par. 9, R.00022A) The Parkers did not report on their Idaho tax returns any of
the income earned by David Parker while he was domiciled in Nevada. (Stip. Facts, par. 10,
R.00022B)
During the taxable years Idaho was a community property state. (Stip. Facts, par. 11,
R.00022B) Nevada also was a community property state during the taxable years. (Stip. Facts, par.
12, R.00022B)
The Audit Division of the Idaho State Tax Commission audited the retums the Parkers filed
with the Commission. (Stip. Facts, par. 13, R.00022B) The Audit Division determined that one-half
of the income earned by David Parker while he was domiciled in Nevada was subject to Idaho
income tax because under the community property laws of Idaho, Kathy Parker was entitled to onehalf of the Nevada income. (Stip. Facts, par. 14, R.00022B)
Attached to the Stipulated Facts as Joint Exhibit 3-C (R.00022P-22U) is a true and correct
copy of the Tax Commission's Amended Decision in this matter. (Stip. Facts, par. 23, R.00022C)
The Tax Commission's Amended Decision upheld the Audit Division's adjustments to the income
reported to the state of Idaho by the Parkers. Specifically, one-half of the income earned by David

Parker while he was domiciled in Nevada was considered to be subject to Idaho income tax. (Stip.
Facts, par. 24, R.00022C)
The Parkers timely appealed the Tax Commission's final decision when they filed a Petition
for Judicial Review with the district court and deposited with the Tax Commission the security
deposit required by Idaho Code Ej 63-3049. (Stip. Facts, par. 25, R.00022C) The sole issue before
the district court was whether the Tax Commission erred when it determined that one-half of the
income earned by David Parker while he was domiciled in Nevada is subject to Idaho income tax.
(Stip. Facts, par. 26, R.00022C)
2. Statements in David Parker's Affidavit Addressed by the District Court.

The Tax Commission objected to several of the statements contained in David Parker's
Affidavit. The Tax Commission submitted a motion to strike outlining those objections. (R.00040)
The district court denied the Tax Commission's motion and admitted the identified portions of the
affidavit. However, the district court weighed David Parker's statements against other evidence
contained in the record. The court record contained conflicting inferences. The court resolved the
inferences in favor of the Tax Commission.
Because the Parkers included David Parker's statements in the Statement of Facts section of
their initial appellate brief, the Tax Commission includes the statements below and the district
court's findings that controverted those statements.
David Parker alleges that since their separation in November of 2000, David Parker did not
receive any financial assistance or benefit, either directly or indirectly, from either Kathy Parker or
her Idaho income. (Appellants' Br. at p. 4, citing 7 2 of David Parker Aff. IR.000251) David Parker
also states that his income was sufficient to meet d l of his financial obligations without any
financial assistance from Kathy Parker. (Appellants' Br. at p. 4, citing 7 3 of David Parker Aff.

[R.00026]) During the taxable years, David Parker testified that he had not received any Idahosourced income, either as wages, dividends or from the sale of property. (Appellants' Br. at p. 6,
citing f[ 2 of David Parker Aff. [R.00026])
The Tax Commission objected to these affidavit statements as irrelevant to the issue raised
before the district court. One-half of the Nevada income is included in the community income
taxable by Idaho by virtue of Kathy Parker's Idaho residence, not the state's contacts with David
Parker. Nonetheless, the district court overruled the Tax Commission's objection stating "these
statements are relevant to the Parkers' Due Process Clause argument that Mr. Parker is not subject
to taxation by the state of Idaho for lack of minimum contacts with the state." (District Court Order
at p. 4, R.00040)
The district court went on to weigh David Parker's statements against other evidence in the
record. The district court found that there were conflicting inferences in the record. Based on the
evidence, the court concluded that during the years at issue, David Parker had an interest in income
producing property located in Idaho; and further, half of the marital community was domiciled in
Idaho. (District Court Order at p. 7, R.00043) David Parker has sufficient minimum contacts with
the state of Idaho to subject him to income tax in the state. (District Court Order at p.7, R.00043) It
was appropriate for the court to resolve conflicting inferences because both parties requested
summary judgment in a de novo proceeding conducted without a jury.

11.
ISSUES
1. The primary issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the district court erred when it
determined that Kathy Parker's community share of the Nevada income was subject to Idaho
income tax. (& Stipulated Facts, par. 26 at p. 4; R.00022D)

2. A secondary issue raised by the Parkers is whether David Parker should be granted equitable
relief and have his income removed &om Idaho taxable income under the relief provisions provided
in the federal tax code.
3. The third issue raised by the Parkers is whether the district court erred when it denied their
motion to strike paragraph 24 of the Affidavit of Mr.

J
i
m

Gunter, a Tax Commission Policy

Specialist.
4. Additionally, the Tax Commission requests an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho
Code 5 63-3049.

111.
BURDEN OF PROOF: STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. BURDEN OF PROOF
A deficiency determination issued by the Idaho State Tax Commission is presumed to be

correct. Albertson's Inc. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 106 Idaho 810,814 (1984); Parsons v. Idaho
State Tax Com'n, 110 Idaho 572, 574-575, n.2 (Ct. App. 1986). The burden is on the petitioner
to show that the tax deficiency is erroneous.

Id.

B. DE NOVO REVIEW AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL
Idaho Code

5 63-3049 governs an appeal from a final decision of the Idaho State Tax

Commission. The statute directs a taxpayer to file a complaint with an appropriate district court.
The case is to proceed as other civil cases but is to be a bench trial. The standard of review for
this appeal is de novo. See also Idaho Code 5 63-3812(c) (appeal from a decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals to the district court "shall be heard and determined by the court without a jury in a
trial de novo on the issues in the same manner as though it were an original proceeding in that
court").

C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL
A s m a r y judgment procedure is appropriate in an appeal of an administrative decision.
Beker Industrial, Inc. v. Georgetown Irrigation District, 101 Idaho 187, 610 P.2d 546 (1980).
Summary judgment is applicable on trial de novo when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Yribar v. Fitz~atrick,87 Idaho 366, 393
P.2d 588 (1964). See also I.R.C.P. 56(c). However, in a trial without a jury, the trial court will
be the trier of fact. As a result, summary judgment is appropriate despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences, as the Court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between
those inferences. Union Pacific Cow. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 139 Idaho 572, 83 P.3d 116
(2004); Williams v. Computer Resources, Inc., 123 Idaho 671,673, 851 P.2d 967,969 (1993).
D. SCOPE OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

In an appeal from an order of s m a r y judgment, this Court's standard of review is the
same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002).

IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The income in this case can be divided into four parts. The Commission asserts tax on
three of them. First, Kathy Parker, an Idaho resident, owes tax on the one-half of Idaho income
that belongs to her. This is not in dispute. Second, Kathy Parker owes tax on the one-half of
Nevada income that belongs to her pursuant to community property law. Idaho residents owe tax
on all of their income regardless of where it is earned.
Third, David Parker owes tax on the one-half of Kathy Parker's Idaho income that
belongs to him pursuant to community property law. Non-residents owe tax on Idaho source

income. Idaho does not claim tax on the one-half of David Parker's Nevada income that belongs
to him.
If there is confusion in this case, it is the result of taxpayers contesting whether Idaho can

tax one-half of David Parker's Nevada income using arguments that are only appropriate to
whether David Parker can be required to pay tax on his one-half of Kathy Parker's Idaho income.

ARGUMENT
A. THE DISTRICT COURT C O W C T L Y FOUND THAT KATHY PARKER OWED
TAX ON ONE-HALF OF THE INCOME DAVID PARKER EARNED IN NEVADA.
1. Under Idaho Community Property Law One-Half of David Parker's Nevada Income is

Kathy Parker's Community Share.
The district court correctly found that the income earned by David Parker while he was
domiciled in Nevada is community property. (District Court Order at p. 6, R.00042) Idaho Code 8
32-906 provides that income earned during the marriage, regardless of source, is community

The district court also was correct in finding that the wife and husband living apart does not
terminate the marriage nor affect each spouse's right to community property. (District Court Order
at p. 6, R.00042) As noted by the district court, "Even when spouses are separated, their earnings
and acquisitions constitute community property." Donaldson v. Donaldson, 111 Idaho 951,957,729
P.2d 426,432 (Ct. App. 1986). The marital community comes into being at marriage and only ends
at one spouse's death or when the husband and wife divorce. Therefore, the earnings of either
spouse while living separate and apart, hut prior to divorce, are community property. Idaho Code fj
32-601; Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976).

2. Idaho May Tax The Nevada Income That Belongs To Kathy Parker.
The district court correctly held that Idaho may tax the Nevada income of an Idaho resident
without violating either the Due Process or Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
a. Statutes Authorizing Taxation of Kathy Parker's Community Share of the Nevada
Income

Kathy Parker was domiciled in and a resident of Idaho during the taxable years at issue.
The Idaho income tax return filing requirements are set out in Idaho Code $ 63-3030. Idaho
Code $ 63-3030(a)(l) sets forth the filing requirements for individuals who are residents of this
state. Residents with a gross income in excess of the threshold amount determined under federal
tax law are required to file an Idaho individual income tax return. Gross income means income
from whatever source derived unless specifically excepted by statute. Idaho Code $ 63-301 1,
referring to Internal Revenue Code

9 61(a) (26 USC $ 61(a)).

There is not an Idaho statutory

exception that applies to the instant case. The specific Idaho Code section that imposes the
Idaho individual income tax is Idaho Code

5 63-3024. Individuals required to file an Idaho

income tax return must pay Idaho income tax on their taxable income at the rate set forth in
Idaho Code $ 63-3024.
b. Taxing One-Half of the Nevada Income Comports with Due process
As a domiciliary and resident of Idaho, Kathy Parker must report and pay tax on income
derived from any source, including her community share of the income David Parker earned in
Nevada. It is well established that domicile itself affords a basis for a state's individual income

tax. New York, ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937) ("That the receipt of income
by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a taxable event is universally recognized.

Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protections
of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government.")
This Court adopted this long-established principle for the taxation of individual income.
Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 340, 393 P.2d 35, 40 (1964). In Herndon, a resident taxpayer
argued it was unconstitutional and unfair to tax income she received from a partnership doing
business in Oklahoma. This Court held that domicile itself affords adequate connection to tax the
income of a domiciliary "including income from sources derived from sources outside the State,
and that there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent the exercise of such power."
Hemdon, 87 Idaho at 340, 393 P.2d at 40. This Court also held that regardless of the soundness
of the underlying policy, the Court was not free to deviate from the plain language of the tax
statute.
But in this instance we do not find the statutes involved to be ambiguous; no
exemption is granted and the legislative intent is to impose a tax on residents of
this state measured by taxable income wherever it is derived. In such case our
duty is clear. We must follow the law as written. If it is socially or economically
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.
Herndon, 87 Idaho at 339, 393 P.2d at 40, citing John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.

I-Jd, 79 Idaho 385, 319 P.2d 195 (1957). The same clear language and legislative intent exists
in the current statutes.
3. The Choice of Law Issue Raised in the Appellants' Brief
The Parkers contend that the community property principles result in an unconstitutional
and inequitable result for tax purposes. However, they alternatively insist that to the extent
community property principles apply, the district court ened in applying Idaho community
property laws rather than Nevada community property law. (Appellants' Br. at pp. 24-28) The
Parkers then speculate that under Nevada community property law, David Parker's income might

be considered his separate property. (Appellants' Br. at pp. 27-28) The Parkers do not provide
any analysis on the conflict or choice of law issue, other than to discuss an Oregon court
decision; the Parkers then ask this Court not to apply the Oregon court's analysis. (Appellants'
Br. at pp. 25-27)
The constitutional standard for choice of law questions is that a state may apply its own
law to a given case if the state has a significant contact or a significant aggregation of contacts
that creates a state interest in the subject of the case, to the extent that the choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shurts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hame, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Thus, a forum state may apply its own law if it
has sufficient contact with the parties and transaction in question.
The district court found half of the marital community was domiciled in Idaho. (District
Court Order at p. 7; R.00043) The district court further found that "Where one of the spouses is a
domiciliary of the taxing state, there is a substantial nexus between the state and the marriage and
the income tax is fairly related to the services provided to the resident spouse." (District Court
Order at p. 8; R.00044)
Idaho has an interest in protecting Kathy Parker's community rights to marital property,
regardless of where it is located. In return, Idaho also protects David Parker's right in marital
property. Just as Kathy Parker is entitled to one-half of the community income earned in Nevada,
David Parker is entitled to one-half of the community income earned in Idaho.
This case does not present an arbitrary or fundamentally unfair situation. Under Idaho
community property law, David Parker remained liable for the debt the community incurred while
domiciled in Idaho. Although David Parker professes to have received no benefit from the Idaho
income, the plain inference is that Kathy Parker used the Idaho income to pay the community debts.

Moreover, the determinations of the Tax Commission and the district court comport with
how community income is treated for federal income tax purposes. Federal case law recognizes not
only a spouse's right to receive one-half of the community income, but also the individual tax
obligation that attends such a right. The United States Supreme Court held that each spouse in a
marriage has a vested right in one-half of any property or income the couple acquires while
domiciled in a community property state. M c C W v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The Court
stated that in a community property state, marriage is viewed as an "equal partnership" and the
spouses are considered as contributing equally to the acquisition of income regardless of the actual
division of labor in the maniage and regardless of which spouse actually earned the income.
Each spouse's right to one-half of the community income vests immediately upon the
couple's right to receive the income. In another case, the Court reasoned that because each spouse
is a vested owner in one-half of the community income, each spouse is responsible for paying tax
on their respective half of the income. Citing an extensive case history on the subject, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
Two months later the Court arrived at the same conclusion with respect to
California community property law and federal income tax under the 1928
[California] Act . . . . Significantly, the Court there answered in the a f h a t i v e . . .
the following question:
"Has the wife under 9 161(a) of the Civil Code of California such an
interest in the community income that she should separately report and pay tax on
one-half of such income?" [States v. Malcolm] 282 U.S. at 794.
This affirmative answer to a question phrased in terms of "should" not
may," clearly indicates that the wife had the obligation, not merely the right, to
report half the community income.

"

U.S. v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971). In Mitchell, the Court affirmed the Internal Revenue
Service's action of assessing a deficiency tax, penalty, and interest to spouses who fail to report
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half of any community income. Each spouse must (not may) report one-half of the community
income when filing separate tax returns.
In this case, the Parkers filed a joint return as a married couple for both federal and state
income tax purposes. (Stip Facts at par. 7, R.00022B)

B. DAVID PARKER'S COMMUNITY SHARE OF IDAHO INCOME IS SUBJECT TO
IDAHO TAX
A nonresident, such as David Parker, is subject to Idaho tax on Idaho source income. Idaho
Code § 63-3030 provides that "any nonresident having for the current taxable year a gross income
from Idaho sources in excess of two thousand five-hundred dollars ($2,500)" shall file an Idaho
income tax return. A nonresident's Idaho taxable income is only that income derived from or
related to sources within Idaho. Idaho Code

9 63-3026A(1).

Again, the United States Supreme

Court has ruled that such a system of taxing nonresidents is constitutional. ShafXer v. Carter, 252
U.S. 37, 52 (1920) ("[Jlust as a State may impose general income taxes upon its own citizens and
residents whose persons are subject to its control, it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty of
like character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes accruing to non-residents from their
property or business within the State, or their occupations carried on therein."). To the extent Mr.
Parker would be considered a separate taxpayer (that is separate from the marital community) he is
only subject to tax on his interest (one-half) of the community income earned by Kathy Parker in
Idaho.

C. THIS CASE DOES NOT IMPLICATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
This case implicates neither the Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause. As
discussed above, Due Process cannot be an issue because Kathy Parker is an Idaho resident and
David Parker is only subject to tax on Idaho source income. It is fair to "haul him into court" in
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Idaho when the issue concerns Idaho income. As to the Commerce Clause, there is no interstate
commerce in this case. Each spouse earns income in their respective state. One-half of David
Parker's Nevada income is attributable to Kathy Parker when David Parker e m s it. One-half of the
Nevada income is taxable because it is income of an Idaho resident. As such, it is taxable regardless
of source. This is long settled law.

1. The Parkers Have Failed to Demonstrate that Taxing One-Half of the Nevada
Income Implicates any Interstate Commerce
A Commerce Clause challenge to state taxation of an individual's income requires a two
step inquiry. Stelzner v. Com'r of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 2001), citing Luther v.
Com'r of Revenue, 588 N.W.2d 502, 510 (Minn.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 821 (1999). First, the
court must determine whether the tax implicates the Commerce Clause. Id. Second, the court must
determine if the Commerce Clause is violated.
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated, a taxpayer must demonstrate
that the state's taxation of their income has a "substantial effect on an identifiable interstate
economic activity or market."

Luther. 588 N.W.2d

at 511. The dormant Commerce Clause

protects markets and participants in markets, not taxpayers as such. Gen. Motors Cow. v. Tracy,
519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997). Therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause will not apply unless there
is actual or prospective competition between entities in an identifiable market and state action
that either expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden on interstate commerce.

Tracv, 519 U.S. at 300. Furthermore, this impact must be more than merely incidental.
514 U.S. 549,559 (1995).
The Stelzner case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court is particularly relevant. In that
case, the taxpayers claimed that Minnesota's taxation of a nonresident's & income violated the
Commerce Clause. Specifically, the Stelners contended that the tax placed on income generated

outside of Minnesota implicated the Commerce Clause because it burdened their ability to continue
with market participants in a competitive interstate market. Stelzner, 621 N.W.2d at 741. While the
Stelners argued that Minnesota's taxation of their entire individual resident income was out of
proportion to the actual income producing activities in Minnesota, the court held the Stelzners did
not show anything more than incidental impact on the cost of doing business in interstate
commerce. Id.
In the instant case, the Parkers also contend that the state tax is out of proportion to Idaho
activities. However, like the Selzners, the Parkers have made no showing of how Idaho's tax would
implicate interstate commerce. In fact, in contrast to the Selzners, the Parkers are not engaged in
interstate commerce.
2. The individual income tax statutes provide a resident with a credit for taxes paid
to another state, thereby avoiding "double taxation."

The Parkers argue that Idaho's proposed taxation of the Nevada income violates the
constitution because it

a result in double taxation.

The Parkers concede that no actual

double taxation occurs in this case because Nevada does not impose an income tax. (Stip. Facts
at par. 8, R.00022B) Because there is no real controversy, the district court properly dismissed
this claim as nonjusticiable and declined to render an advisory opinion, citing Canyon View
Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 615, 619 P.2d 122, 133 (1980). (District
Court Order at p. 8, R.00044)
The Parkers imply that if Nevada imposed an income tax, then David Parker would report
100% of his income and one-half of Kathy's income. Idaho would tax 100% of Kathy's income
and one-half of Mr. Parker's income. These statements miss the very difference between the
corporate income tax and the individual income tax.

The individual income tax statutes provide resident taxpayers with a credit for taxes paid
to other states. Idaho Code

5

63-3029. If Kathy Parker paid tax to Nevada on her half of the

Nevada income she would not be taxed again by Idaho. Similarly, if David Parker paid tax to
Idaho on his half of the Idaho income, he would receive a credit in Nevada (if Nevada had an
income tax similar to Idaho) and he would not pay tax to Nevada on his share of the Idaho
income. The credit for taxes paid to other states specifically addresses the hypothetical posed by
the Parkers.

D. IDAHO HAS NOT INCORPORATED THE EQUITABLE RELIEF PROVISIONS OF
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6015(f).
The Parkers seek equitable relief only for state income tax purposes. The Parkers argue
that federal regulations provide equitable relief which would entitle them to treat the community
income as separate property despite filing a joint federal return. The Parkers assert Idaho should
provide similar equitable relief because Idaho Code

5 63-3002 provides that Idaho will follow the

provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. That statute provides:

63-3002. DECLARATION OF INTENT. It is the intent of the legislature by
the adoption of this act, insofar as possible to make the provisions of the Idaho
act identical to the provisions of the Federal Internal Revenue Code relating
to the measurement of taxable income, to the end that the taxable income
reported each taxable year by a taxpayer to the internal revenue service shall be
the identical sum reported to this state, subject only to modifications contained in
the Idaho law; to achieve this result by the application of the various
provisions of the Federal Internal Revenue Code relating to the definition of
income, exceptions therefrom, deductions (personal and otherwise), accounting
methods, taxation of trusts, estates, partnerships and corporations, basis and other
pertinent provisions to gross income as defined therein, resulting in an amount
called "taxable income" in the Internal Revenue Code, and then to impose the
provisions of this act thereon to derive a sum called "Idaho taxable income"; to
impose a tax on residents of this state measured by Idaho taxable income
wherever derived and on the Idaho taxable income of nonresidents which is the
result of activity within or derived from sources within this state. All of the
foregoing is subject to modifications in Idaho law including, without limitation,
modifications applicable to unitary groups of corporations, which include
corporations incorporated outside the United States.

Idaho Code S; 63-3002 (Emphasis added). The Parkers argue that federal regulations provide
equitable relief which would entitle them to treat their community income as separate property
despite filing a joint federal return. The Parkers assert Idaho should provide similar equitable
relief because Idaho Code S; 63-3002 provides that Idaho will follow the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. Interestingly, the Parkers do not seek relief from the joint filing at the
federal level.
This argument is wrong. Generally, federal tax law does not preempt the state's taxing
authority. Idaho Code S; 63-3002 demonstrates that Idaho models its income tax structure on that of
the federal tax law, but federal tax law does not govern every aspect of Idaho's income tax.
Lockheed Martin Cornoration v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 142 Idaho 790, 134 P.3d 641 (2006)
(Contractor was not required to report property pursuant to the method described in the Internal
Revenue Code, when the state's statute provided a different method). Idaho retains the right to
make its own state-specific laws. In fact, adopting federal tax law in a wholesale fashion would
amount to an u n l a h l delegation of the state's legislative authority. See State v. Heitz, 72 Idaho
107,238 P.2d 439 (1 95 1).
Idaho Code S; 63-3002 states Idaho will mirror the provisions of the federal tax code for
purposes of determining taxable income, deductions, accounting methods, and other standards
governing taxable income. Statutes are interpreted based on the words contained in the statute,
not by adding language that does not exist in the statute. Marmon v. Marmon, 121 Idaho 480,
825 P.2d 1136 (1992). Idaho Code S; 63-3002 does not provide that Idaho will follow the federal
"equitable relief' provisions regarding the liability that results after the determination of taxable
income.

Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 6015 cannot be used to preempt state commnnity property
laws to change the determination of Idaho taxable income. For example, in the recent case of
Ordlock v. C.I.R., 533 F.3d 1139 (9'h Cir., July 24,2008), the Nmth Circuit Court of Appeals d e d
that IRC F, 6015 did not preempt the community property laws of California for tax refund purposes.
The equitable relief sought by David Parker would only relieve him of liability. It does not
change the determination of taxable income. As an Idaho resident, Kathy Parker would remain
liable for her community share of the income in question, namely, the Nevada income earned by
David Parker.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, Idaho has not adopted the equitable relief
provisions of the federal tax law. Adopting the federal relief provisions would conflict with the
state remedies and appeals procedures in current Idaho statutes and, therefore, would require
legislative action, as this Court noted in the Hemdon case cited above. See also, Idaho State Tax
Com'n v. Stang, 135 Idaho 800, 802-03, 25 P.3d 113, 115-16 (2001), citing Potlatch Com. v.
Idaho State Tax Com'n, 128 Idaho 387,913 P.2d 1157 (1996); Boaner v. State Dep't of Revenue
and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 693 P.2d 1056 (1984); and Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393
P.2d 35 (1964).
E. THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX CASES CITED BY THE PARKERS ARE
INAPPOSITE.
Taxpayers argue corporate constitutional income tax law that is inappropriate to apply to
individuals. This is because the statutory schemes for imposing tax are necessarily quite
different. The statutory system for taxing an individual is based on sourcing the income as
discussed above.
Idaho imposes a different system of taxation on corporations.

Idaho Code

5

63-3027 provides that the taxable income of multistate or unitary

corporations is apportioned and allocated, rather than sourced to a particular state. A multistate
or unitary business is one which operates in more than one state. Because the business is present
in all states, its income cannot be sourced to just one state. Also, because they operate in more
than one state, such businesses can shift the income, expenses, property, payroll, and sales
among a group of affiliated entities to avoid state taxes.
To resole the problem of sourcing and to mitigate the shifting, courts developed what has
become known as the "unitary business" doctrine. The unitary business doctrine treats a group
of commonly owned businesses as a single business for purposes of allocation and
apportionment, if the businesses are tied together operationally under constitutional standards
developed in Supreme Court case law. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director. Div. of Taxation, 504
U.S. 768, 781-783 (1992); Container Cow. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 179180 (1983). As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court: "The principal virtue of the unitary business
principle of taxation is that it does a better job of accounting for the many subtle and largely
unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single enterprise
than, for example, geographical or transactional accounting." Allied-Simal, 504 U.S. at 783
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
The unitary business principles developed in response to the emergence of interstate
businesses, such as railroad, telegraph, and express companies. They created "a novel problem:
A State often cannot tax its fair share of the value of a multistate business by simply taxing the
capital within its borders. The whole of the enterprise is generally more valuable than the sum of
its parts[.]" For example, one railroad track is worth little except as part of a long interstate
railroad line. The unitary business principle dealt with that problem by focusing on the

taxpayer's business unit. If the value the state wished to tax derived from a 'unitary business'
operated within and without the state, the state could tax an apportioned share of the value of that
business instead of isolating the value attributable to the operation of the business within the
state.

Exxon Cow. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223 (1980) (citing

Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,273 (1978)).
In contrast, the state's connection to tax an individual is well defined and does not need
approximation such as the apportionment of income for a unitmy business. A resident is taxed on
gross income derived from whatever source because the resident has sufficient connection with the
state by virtue of living in the state. A nonresident is taxed only on income with an Idaho source.
Here, Kathy Parker has an interest in the Nevada income and there is no question about the amount
of income attributable to her. Kathy Parker owned one-half of the income earned in Nevada. As an
Idaho resident, the Nevada income is subject to Idaho income tax.

F. THE PARKERS' OBJECTIONS TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. JIM GUNTER
The Tax Commission made a motion to s e e portions of David Parker on several grounds.
The Tax Commission filed its motion to strike with the Court on July 18,2008. One of the portions
of the affidavit the Commission asked the Court to strike was the following:
During the years at issue in this litigation, I have not received any Idaho-sourced
income in any fashion, either in the form of wages, dividends or from the sale of
property. I do not have any state income tax filing requirements because Nevada
does not have a state income tax."
(Parker Aff., par. 6 at p. 2, R.00026) In order to protect its position in this case and rebut David
i Gunter.
Parker's statement, the Tax Commission filed the Affidavit of Jm

Mr. Gunter has served with the Tax Commission as a Senior Tax Auditor and currently is a
Tax Policy Specialist who conducts administrative appeals brought by taxpayers. In applying his

personal knowledge of this case and his expertise as an auditor and appeals officer, Mr. Gunter
concluded that David Parker would have an Idaho filing requirement regardless of his wages.
First, under community property laws, David Parker owned one-half of the Idaho income
earned by his wife, Kathy Parker, and would be required to report that income to Idaho. (Gunter
Aff., par.9-16, at pp. 3-4, R.00030-31) Second, after examining the stipulated facts submitted by
the parties, Mr. Gunter found that David Parker had income from other sources (a partnership and
an S corporation) that Mr. Parker would be required to report to Idaho for income tax purposes.
(Gunter Aff., par. 17-24, at pp. 4-6, R.0003 1-33)
On appeal to this Court, the Parkers only wish to object to paragraph 24 of Mr. Gunter's
affidavit.
24. From my review of the schedules of income in the Tax Commission's file
(See Stipulated Facts, Joint Exhibit 1-A, Split Domicile Income for 2003 and
for 2004), it appears that even the taxable income (not to be confksed with the
gross income) of Western Land and Development LLC or KPGMJC
Investments alone would have given David Parker an Idaho filing requirement
for the taxable year 2003. Further, it appears that David Parker's proportionate
share of the taxable income of RCMP Investments LLC would have given him
an Idaho filing requirement for the taxable year 2004.
(Gunter Aff. at p. 6, R.00033) The Parkers submitted a motion to strike portions of Mr. Gunter's
affidavit. The Parkers contend that portions of the affidavit "state legal conclusions which
conclusions are solely within the province of this Court." (Parkers' Mot. to Strike at pp. 1-2,
R.00035-36) The Parkers also feel the statements are speculative.

1.

Qualification of Mr. Gunter
Applying the relevant law to the pertinent facts in determining a taxpayer's obligation is

precisely what Mr. Gunter and the Tax Commission do in discharging their official duties. Mr.
Gunter has established his foundation in the first eight paragraphs of his affidavit. He has been an
auditor for the Tax Commission and currently serves as a Tax Policy Specialist for the Tax

Commission.

As a Tax Policy Specialist, he conducted the redetermination requested by the

Parkers when they filed a protest of the deficiency proposed by the Tax Commission's audit staff.
In both positions, Mr. Gunter has been required to evaluate the applicable facts and apply the
relevant law to determine a taxpayer's correct income tax obligation.
To understand Mr. Gunter's qualifications, a brief description of the statutory process for
resolving protests of proposed deficiencies is helpll. Provided below is a brief overview of the
administrative appeal process before the Tax Commission. The relevant statutory authority
outlining this process is set out in Idaho Code @63-3044 through 63-3049.
The administrative appeal process begins when the Tax Commission determines that
there is a tax "deficiency." Idaho Code 5 63-3044. In general, a tax deficiency results when the
Tax Commission determines that the amount of tax that is actually due under the applicable tax
statutes is less than the amount of tax shown due on the return. Idaho Code § 63-3044(a). If no
tax is shown due on the return, or no return is filed, then a deficiency will result if the
Commission determines that the taxpayer actually owes some amount of tax.
Once the Tax Commission determines that a deficiency exists, the next step is to notify
the taxpayer of the deficiency and to give that taxpayer the right to challenge the Tax
Commission's determination. Idaho Code
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63-3045(1)(a). Notification is done through a

Notice of Deficiency Determination. The Notice of Deficiency Determination informs the
taxpayer of the amount of taxes, penalty, and interest that the Commission claims is still owing,
advises the taxpayer of the reasons for the deficiency determination, and provides the taxpayer
with a written explanation of that taxpayer's right to appeal.

Id.

The taxpayer is given sixty-three (63) days &om the date of the Notice of Deficiency
Determination was mailed to file a written protest with the Tax Commission. If a valid protest is

filed within the sixty-three day time period, the Tax Commission is required to send a letter
acknowledging that a valid protest has been filed.

Idaho Code $ 63-3045B(3).

This

acknowledgment letter must be sent within fourteen (14) days from the receipt of the letter of
protest.

Id.
In order to be valid, the protest (sometimes referred to as a "petition for redetermination")

must be timely filed and it must meet the minimum requirements set out in Idaho Tax
Commission Administration and Enforcement Rule 320.01 (IDAPA 35.02.01.320.01).
Idaho Code $ 63-3045(1)(b). According to that Tax Commission administrative rule, the protest
must contain the following information to be perfected:
a. Name, address and pertinent identification number;
b. The period to which the deficiency relates;
c. The specific item or items in the Notice of Deficiency to which the taxpayer
objects; and
d. The factual or legal basis for the objections made.
Id.
-

If the written protest does not meet these minimum requirements, the protest is not

"perfected." The Tax Commission must then notifl the taxpayer that the protest was invalid and
inform the taxpayer of the corrective action that is necessary to perfect the protest. Idaho Code 8
63-3045(1)(b). The taxpayer has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of the notice to perfect the
protest. Id.
If the taxpayer fails to file a protest with the Tax Commission - or fails to perfect the
protest - within the time allowed, the taxpayer's right to challenge the deficiency determination
lapses and the amount asserted in that deficiency becomes assessed and subject to collection
action. Idaho Code $$ 63-3045(5), 63-3045B(1), 63-3045B(2); Administration and Enforcement
Rule 320.04. See also State Tax Com'n v. Western Electronics. Inc., 99 Idaho 226, 227, 580
P.2d 72, 73 (1978).

If, on the other hand, the taxpayer files a perfected protest, the taxpayer is given the
opportunity to have an informal hearing before a Tax Commissioner, or the Commissioner's
designee, to explain the factual and/or legal basis for the protest. Idaho Code § 63-3045(2). This
is the taxpayer's opportunity to explain to a Commissioner, or the designee of a Commissioner,
why the deficiency proposed by the Audit Division should be "redetermined."
After the informal hearing is held, the Tax Commission is given 180 days to issue its
final decision regarding the protest. Idaho Code § 63-3045B(3)(b). If the taxpayer does not
request an informal hearing before a member of the Tax Commission, that taxpayer can still start
the 180-day time limitation by making a written request for a final decision. Idaho Code

63-

3045B(3)(a). The written request for a final decision must be in the form prescribed by Idaho
Tax Commission Administration and Enforcement Rule 325.04 (IDAPA § 3.5.02.01.325.04). If
the Tax Commission fails to issue its final decision within the 180-day period, "the notice of
deficiency shall be null and void ab initio, with prejudice." Idaho Code 63-3045B(5).
Assuming that it is issued timely, the final decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission
will uphold the deficiency determination, withdraw the deficiency determination, or modify the
deficiency determination and uphold it as so modified. If the taxpayer still does not agree with
the determination of the Tax Commission, that taxpayer has the right to appeal the final decision
to district court or, in most cases, to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. Idaho Code 63-3049.

2.

The Role of Jim Gunter in this Case
In this case, the Parkers received an adverse decision from the Tax Commission and

appealed to this Court. The Commissioner's designee who heard the Parkers' protest was Jim
Gunter. (Gunter Aff., par. 8, at pp. 2-3, R.00029-30) Mr. Gunter described the redetermination
process as:

A redetermination is conducted by: (a) reviewing the written information
submitted by the taxpayer both before and after the audit; (b) reviewing federal
tax information, including federal audit information, supplied by the Internal
Revenue Service; (c) discussing factual circumstances with the taxpayer; (d)
reviewing and applying the provisions of the Idaho Income Tax Act, the Idaho
Administrative Rules, the Internal Revenue Code, federal treasury regulations, the
Multistate Tax Commission Special Industry Regulations, and a variety of statutes
and legal rulings to determine the Idaho tax liability of the taxpayer; (e)
discussing the initial tax liability determination with the taxpayer in an informal
conference; and (0 making adjustments to the tax liability following the informal
conference as may be necessary.
(Gunter Aff., par. 7 at p. 2; R.00029) Mr. Gunter then states that during the course of the
redetermination, he reviewed the Tax Commission's audit file and a variety of the types of
information discussed above, including relevant case holdings and statutes addressing the
community property nature of a married couple's income. (Gunter Aff., par. 8 at pp. 2-3;
R.00029-30)
Based on Mr. Gunter's findings, the Tax Commission issued a decision holding Kathy
Parker had an ownership interest in one-half of the wages earned by David Parker while he was
domiciled in Nevada. After reviewing the audit schedules, Mr. Gunter also determined that
David Parker had a filing requirement with the state of Idaho regardless of the issues in this case.
3. The Audit Schedules Attached as a Joint Exhibit to the Stipulated Facts are not
Speculative.
The Stipulated Facts contained an audit schedule showing a breakdown of Kathy Parker's
income and David Parker's income. (Joint Exhibit I-A, R.00022J-22K) The audit schedules were
included in the Notice of Deficiency Determination the Tax Commission sent to the Parkers. The
schedules demonstrate that David Parker received Idaho source income from Western Land and
Development LLC or KPGMJC Investments, which alone would have given David Parker an
Idaho filing requirement for the taxable year 2003.

Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 63-3030, a nonresident with more than $2,500 of Idaho source
income was required to file an Idaho income tax return for 2003. The audit schedules show that
David Parker received Idaho source income from the entities in the amount of $13,122 and
$19,506 respectively. The Parkers did not protest this determination before the Commission.
During the appeal before the district court, the only rebuttal to the audit schedules offered
by the Parkers was David Parker's simple conclusion that he did not have an Idaho filing
requirement, a conclusion without supporting facts or details. Mere conclusory allegations are
not sufficient to rebut fact established by an opposing party in a summary judgment proceeding.

B & K Fabricators, Inc. v. Sutton, 126 Idaho 934, 937, 894 P.2d 167, 170 (Ct. App. 1995). See
also Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,368 (1969).

G. ATTORNEY PEES
In Idaho, attorney fees and costs may be awarded only when provided by contract or by
statute. Hellar v. Cenmsa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 (1984). All of the contractual or
statutory requirements must be met before the award can be granted. Idaho Code

5

63-3049

provides:
63-3049. JUDICIAL REVIEW. (a) Redetermination by the state tax
commission may be reviewed in the district court for Ada county or the county in
which the taxpayer resides or has his principal office or place of business by a
complaint filed by the taxpayer against the state tax commission within ninetyone (91) days after the receipt of notice of the decision of the state tax
commission denying, in whole or in part, any protest of the taxpayer or, within the
same period, by filing an appeal with the board of tax appeals.
(d) Whenever it appears to the court that:

(1) Proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained by a party
primarily for delay; or
(2) A party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or groundless; or
(3) A party unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies;
26

the court, in its discretion, may require the party which did not prevail to
pay to the prevailing party costs, expenses and attorney's fees.
Idaho Code

3 63-3049(2001) (Emphasis added). The Tax Commission believes the Parkers'

position is frivolous and groundless.
As discussed above, it is well-established in Idaho statute and holdings of this Court, as
well as the United States Supreme Court, that a state can constitutionally tax the income of a
resident regardless of where the income is earned. The Parkers failed to cite the relevant Idaho
case, Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 340, 393 P.2d 35, 40 (1965), that so held. They
completely failed to disclose this case which is on point and is contrary to their position. Instead
of attempting to distinguish the case, which was cited in the District Court Order (R.00042), the
Parkers have misconstrued corporate income tax cases and contend that states cannot tax income
earned outside its borders, unless the taxpayer is a unitary business. There is no authority that
supports such a contention.
Additionally, it is well established that even under the federal tax system, a taxpayer
cannot resort to the "equitable relier' provisions of Internal Revenue Code

9

6015(f) in court

before first asking the administrative agency for the requested relief. The Parkers did not seek
equitable relief before the Commission and therefore did not seek it in good faith when they
raised the request for the first time with the district court.

VI.
CONCLUSION
Based on the relevant and undisputed facts, the district court correctly found the Tax
Commission is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The state of Idaho has sufficient
connection with the community and the income it seeks to tax. Idaho is entitled to tax one-half

of the Nevada income because that portion of the Nevada income is the income of an Idaho
resident, Kathy Parker. Under holdings of both this Court and the United States Supreme Court,
a state may tax the income of a resident "wherever the income is derived" and such taxation
comports with the Due Process and Interstate Commerce Clauses of the United States
Constitution.

Moreover, such a method of taxation is hdarnentally fair in that it is

proportionally related to the protections afforded to the community by the Idaho.
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